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LEGISLATIVE NOTES
LIVESTOCK ON THE HIGHWAYS
Florida Laws 1949, c. 25286

On July 1, 1950, an act forbidding the running of livestock at
large on the public roads of the State of Florida became effective.'
At English common law the owner of livestock was under no
duty to restrain them from going unattended on the public highways. 2 If, however, they-trespassed upon another's land, their owner

was liable for such trespass and any resulting damage, regardless
of whether he intentionally caused or negligently allowed them to

stray.3
In Florida the early public policy was to encourage the raising of
livestock, as illustrated by the 1823 statute of the Territory of Florida
permitting them to run at large on all unfenced lands without
liability of their owner for resulting damage. 4 With the exception
of laws of local application,5 this policy has persisted to the present
time. 6 In this field of legal control the common law no longer prevails

in Florida; we have never recognized the prohibition of the straying
of livestock on private property; 7 and today the common law rule
permitting them to run at large on public highways is also abrogated.

As regards scope of application, the statute, although repeatedly
referring to the public roads of Florida, provides: 8
'This chapter and the related chapter in regard to fencing and posting appears
as F.A,. STAT. c. 588 (1949). Chapter 25236 begins at Section 588.12. The
session law itself, however, which is quoted herein, remains the official version
of each 1949 statute unless and until it is adopted by the Legislature in 1951 in
the form in which it is printed in the 1949 revision; for a detailed explanation
see 2Legis., 3 U. or FLA. L. REv. 74, 77-80 (1950).
E.g., Heaths Garage, Ltd. v. Hodges, 2 K.B. 370 (1916); Jones v. Lee, 106
L.T. 51 (1911); Cox v. Burbridge, 13 C.B.N.S. 430, 143 Eng. Rep. 171 (1863).
SE.g., Cox v. Burbridge, 13 C.B.N.S. 430, 143 Eng. Rep. 171 (1863); Forsythe
v. Price, 8 Watts 282, 34 Am. Dec. 465 (Pa. 1839).
4
Fla. Terr. Act of June 11, 1823.
5
E.g., Fla. Laws 1949, c. 25591; cf. in this connection the broad authorization
of municipal ordinances in FA. STAT. §168.09 (1949).
6
Thomas v. Mills, 107 Fla. 385, 144 So. 882 (1932); sqe Harris v. Baden, 154
Fla. 373, 881, 17 So.2d 608, 612 (1944).
7
See, e.g., Morgan v. Lakeland, 90 Fla. 525, 581, 107 So. 269, 271 (1925).
8
Fla. Laws 1949, c. 25236, §2(4).

(223)
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"'Public Roads' as used herein shall mean those highways
within the state which are, or may be, maintained by the state
road department, including the full width of the right of way."
Apparently, therefore, the statute covers only state highways, and
perhaps state aid roads, 9 although the ambiguous wording of the
quoted definition leaves the matter open to debate.
The statute provides in its main operative sections for criminal
punishment and civil liability of livestock owners, and for the impounding, redemption, and sale of livestock found on state highways.
CRIMnNAL PENALTY

This statute obligates the owner of livestock to prevent them from
10
running at large or straying on the public roads. Section 13 provides:
"Any owner of livestock who unlawfully, intentionally, knowingly or negligently permits the same to run at large or stray
upon the public roads of this state or any person who shall
release livestock, after being impounded, without authority of
the impounder, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor .... "
Non-performance of a duty imposed by law may be punished
criminally. The legislature can dispense with the necessity of proof
of intent;" that is, negligence can itself be made the basis of a
crime. 12 If, in violation of a statutory command, an owner refuses
to restrain his livestock when he can reasonably foresee that they
will stray on the highways, he can be punished criminally.
It is often stated that in order to be convicted of criminal negligence more flagrant negligence must be proved than in a civil
proceeding. 13 The more logical view, under a statute of this type,
9
FLA. STAT. §341.16 (1949) so defines "state aid" roads as to bring them,
perhaps, within Fla. Laws 1949, e. 25286, §2(4).
'OFla. Laws 1949, c. 25236, §8. The maximum penalty is six months' imprisonment and $500 fine.
"People v. Pociask, 14 Cal.2d 679, 91 P.2d 199 (1989); Smith v. State, 71
Fla. 2639, 71 So. 915 (1916); Mills v. State, 58 Fla. 741, 51 So. 278 (1910).
' People v. Pociask, 14 Cal.2d 679, 91 P.2d 199 (1939).
'3French v. State, 28 Ala. App. 147, 180 So. 592 (1938); Commonwealth v.
Tackett, 299 Ky. 781, 187 S.W.2d 297 (1945); Potter v. State, 174 Tenn. 118,
124 S.W.2d 232 (1989); Copeland v. State. 154 Tenn. 7, 285 S.W. 565 (1926).
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would seem to be that in a criminal action there can be a conviction
only if the defendant is found negligent beyond a reasonable doubt,
whereas in a civil case the verdict is based upon the preponderance
14
of evidence.
IMPOUNDING AND SALE OF LIVESTOCK

The sheriff, other county law enforcement officers, and the state
highway patrol are under a duty to impound livestock found on the
highways unless under manual control. 15
In exercising its police power the state may prohibit livestock
from running at large anywhere, and may provide for summary
impounding and sale irrespective of negligence in the manner of
keeping.' 6 A fortiori it can confine to certain types of highways this
prohibition of straying.
Statutory procedure for summary impounding must be strictly
followed; any substantial deviation therefrom voids the entire transaction,' 7 especially as regards the notice and the waiting period between impounding and sale.' 8 A presumption of validity attaches
to the acts of the sheriff, and the complainant has the burden of
proving non-compliance with the prescribed procedure. 19
In the impounding and sale of livestock, due process does not
always require a court proceeding.20 Provisions for administrative
action, similar to those of the subject statute,2 1 have already been
(11th ed. 1932).
Fla. Laws 1949, c. 25236, §5. Section 2(3) states: "'Running at large' or

141 WHARTON, Cnmmr.AL LAw 219 n.4
15

'straying' shall mean any livestock found or being on any public roads of this state
and not under manual control of a person."
IcGill v. Wilder, 95 Fla. 901, 116 So. 870 (1928).

17Aguiar v. Sanders, 23 Cal. App.2d 122, 72 P.2d 196 (1937); Haden v.
Fisher, 154 Okla. 228, 7 P.2d 488 (1932).
'sFort Smith v. Dodson, 51 Ark. 447, 11 S.W. 687 (1889); McDonald v.
Lawrence, 93 Okla. 288, 220 Pac. 473 (1923); Benningfield v. Kerr, 292 S.W.
970 (Tex. App. 1927).

19Burton v. Johnson, 143 Fla. 245, 196 So. 489 (1940); accord, e.g., Raines

v. Pile, 182 Tenn. 283, 185 S.W.2d 628 (1945). Contra: McCrossin v. Davis, 100
Ala. 631, 13 So. 607 (1893); Johnston v. Pennington, 105 Ark. 278, 150 S.W. 863
(1912); Fort Smith v. Dodson, 51 Ark. 447, 11 SW. 687 (1889); Jorgenson v.
Story, 78 Mont. 477, 254 Pac. 427 (1927).
20Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 (1878); Gill v. Wilder, 95 Fla. 901,

116 So. 870 (1928).

2
lThese relate to various types of constructive notice, killing of animals ifno
bidder isfound, turning of proceeds into the county fine and forfeiture fund, and
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upheld by the Florida Supreme Court as a valid exercise of police
power. 22 Section 7, however, is subject to possible attack in certain
ifistances that may arise in connection with impounding costs. As

regards hogs, goats and sheep, the fees can reach proportions of
such size as to give rise to the contention that they are confiscatory
and therefore unconstitutional. 23 If the officers impound a single
hog, sheep or goat and the owner does not redeem it before the end
24
the cost will
of the redemption period that must precede sale,
closely approach the market value of the animal and may even
2
exceed it. 25 In Glisson v. Hancock, the Florida Supreme Court
27
held that the imposition of statutory fees totaling $6.50 per animal
on impounded hogs, goats and sheep violated both the Federal and
Florida Constitutions as a deprivation of property without due process
of law 28 in view of the fact that this amount exceeded the value of
the impounded animal. The opinion did admit, however, that this
constitute a reasonable fee when applied to more
same sum might 29
valuable animals.
30
The Court purported to be following Morgan v. Lakeland, although in reality it went far beyond that decision. In the Morgan
case the fee for impounding, quite apart from costs for care of the
detention of animals until reasonable costs anc' fees have been paid.
22
For a comprehensive opinion on these various points see Gill v. Wilder, 95
Fla. 901, 116 So. 870 (1928); accord, Howell v. Daughet, 148 Ark. 450, 230 S.W.

559 (1921).

23U. S. CoNsr. Amend XIV, §1; FLA. CONST. DecL of Rights, §12.
24
Fla. Laws 1949, c. 25236, §6, requires that the owner shall be notified
immediately after impounding. If he does not redeem the animal within three
days, the notice of sale shall issue, the sale to take place not more than 10 or
less than 5 days after issue of the notice (excluding Sundays and holidays).
25Fla. Laws 1949, c. 25236, §7, provides for the following fees: $2.50 plus
mileage for impounding each animal; $1.50 plus mileage for service of notice on
the owner; 500 per day per animal for feed and care; $2.00 for advertising sale
of the animal (amount as set out in FLA. STAT. §30.23 (1949)); $1.00 for sale of
the animal; and 500 for report of the sale. On the Chicago Livestock Market, hogs
were quoted at from $9.00 to $17.35 per cwt., sheep from $8.50 to $28.00 per
cwt. No prices were available on goats. Chicago Daily Tribune, April 29. 1950,
§2, p. 1, col. 5.
26132 Fla. 321, 181 So. 879 (1938).
27
Fla. Laws 1937, c. 18836.
28
See note 23 supra.
29132 Fla. 321, 324, 181 So. 379, 880 (1938).

3090 Fla. 525, 107 So. 269 (1925).
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animal, was high even by present economic standards; in the Glisson
case this factor was largely ignored. The true test of reasonableness,
as opposed to confiscation, should be based on a close relationship
between the statutory amounts set and the actual cost of the care
furnished and of the steps necessarily taken in order to render redemption feasible at all. The market value of the animal should, in
itself, be immaterial, although it is apparent that fees for cheaper
animals should be less because the cost of feeding and caring for
them is less. Perhaps for this reason the fees should run to scale
according to the type of animal.
The statute specifies the amount of care to be accorded impounded
animals, 3 1 and presumably their owner may recover in damages
for failure to supply it.32 To hold that public policy can be defeated
by the complaint of a person that it costs him too much to break
the law, or to hold that the taxpayer alternatively must foot the bill
for boarding an animal below the actual cost of the care provided,
is to introduce a unique principle; and, in so far as the opinion in
the Glisson case lends support to this extreme position, it is in need
of limitation to the facts of record in that case.
A related possible objection arises from the grant of authority
to impound irrespective of negligence on the part of the owner. 33
Admittedly this imposes a hardship on him in those few instances
in which he is not negligent. Probably the answer is that the loss
occasioned will be slight for the owner that makes any real effort
to obey the law.
CAWL Lt .Bnrn
Section 4 provides:
"Every owner of livestock who intentionally, wilfully, carelessly or negligently suffers or permits such livestock to run at
large upon or stray upon the public roads of this state shall be
liable in damages for all injury and property damage sustained
by any person by reason thereof."
31

FIa. Laws 1949, c. 25236, §11.
of Greencastle v. Martin, 74 Ind. 449, 39 Am. Rep. 93 (1881); Adams
v. Adams, 13 Pick. 384 (Mass. 1830).
33
Fla. Laws 1949, c. 252386, §§3, 5-12; see note 16 supra.
32City
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Although the statute does not specifically limit the liability of livestock owners to collisions between their animals and motor vehicles,
the discussion in this section analyzes this type of liability as the
one of the widest interest and importance.
Section 4 sets out two broad grounds of liability for damage caused
by straying livestock: negligent disregard of the prohibition, and
intentional violation. Although some actions will probably be predicated on the latter ground, most of them will undoubtedly be based
upon the former, by virtue of the difficulty of proving the owner's
intent.
Two divergent views exist as regards a presumption of negligence.
In the absence of an express statutory presumption, 34 a few courts
have rejected any inference of negligence from the mere presence
of livestock on the highway in violation of a statute; 30 the plaintiff
motorist or passenger is required to prove affirmatively all the facts
that show the defendant's negligence. Since, however, these facts
are within the peculiar knowledge of the defendant in most instances, recovery is in practice rendered very difficult.
A slight majority of the courts confronted with this issue regard
the presence of livestock at large on the highway as prima facie
evidence of negligence; the owner is accordingly required to go
forward and rebut this presumption. 3 6 The California Supreme Court,
in expressly applying to this type of situation the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur, characterized its basis as the fact that the defendant
either knows or has the best opportunity of ascertaining the cause
of the accident. 37 Other jurisdictions have reached the same result
341LL. ANN. STAT. c. 8, §1 (Smith-Hurd 1941); Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. §14463
(1939). Conversely, CAL. Acaic. CoDE §423 (1943) eliminates any presumption

of negligence.
35

Favre v. Medlock, 212 Ark. 911, 208 S.W.2d 439 (1948); Gardner v. Black,

217 N.C. 573, 9 S.E.2d 10 (1940); accord, Granger v. Tremblay, 113 Vt. 32, 28
A.2d 696 (1942); cf. Champlin Ref. Co. v. Cooper, 184 Okla. 153, 86 P.2d 61
(1938) (motorists not in the class protected by statute).
36

Hansen v. Kemmish, 201 Iowa 1008, 208 N.W. 277 (1926); Bender v.

Welsh, 344 Pa. 392, 25 A.2d 182 (1942); Adamcik v. Knight, 170 S.W.2d 521
(Tex. Civ. App. 1943); accord, Doherty v. Sweetser, 82 Hun 556, 31 N.Y. Supp.
649 (1894); see Wigginton & Sweeney v. Bruce's Guardian, 174 Ky. 691, 192

S.W.
850 (1917).
3
7

Kenney v. Antoretti, 211 Cal. 336, 295 Pac. 341, 342 (1931). The law has
now been changed by statute, CAL. Acaic. CoDE §423 (1943); there is now no
presumption of a livestock owner's negligence in a collision between auto and

domestic animal.
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38
without relying on res ipsa loquitur expressly.
In Florida res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law; it
is rather a rule of evidence permitting the jury to infer negligence
when the injuring instrumentality is under the exclusive management and control of the defendant and the plaintiff without contributory negligence is injured in an accident not ordinarily occurring without negligence. 39 No undue stretch of the imagination is
required to apply this doctrine to automobile accidents caused by
the straying of livestock on the highways; under this statute such
accidents will seldom be possible without negligence on the part
of the livestock owner in keeping his animals. In most instances
the other two prerequisites of res ipsa loquitur can also be met:
absence of contributory negligence on the part of the motorist, and
exclusive management and control of the livestock by their owner
if he makes any serious effort to obey the law. The degree of control
actually exercised in this situation does not properly enter into the
determination of the existence of exclusive control; the degree will
necessarily vary with the amount of care that each individual owner
may desire to exercise.
The application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not in
Florida shift the burden of proof to the defendant; neither does
40
it alone constitute an adequate basis for a directed verdict. It
merely provides a strengthening inference to be considered by the
ignores
jury along with any other evidence. 4 ' If the jury arbitrarily
42
trial.
new
a
grant
may
judge
trial
the
this inference,
Even if the technical prerequisites of res ipsa loquitur are not
satisfied in an accident of this type, negligence on the part of the
owner might still be inferred as a matter of law. In view of the
43
specific statutory imposition of a duty on the owner, the mere fact
38

See note 36 supra.

0

39Orme v. Burr, 157 Fla. 378, 25 So.2d 870 (1946); American Dist. Elec.
Protective Co. v. Seaboard A.L. Ry., 129 Fla. 518, 177 So. 294 (1937); Bujol v.
Gulf State Utilities Co., 147 So. 545 (La. App. 1933); 1 U. or FLA. L. REv. 470
(1948).
4
OAmerican Dist. Elec. Protective Co. v. Seaboard A.L. Ry., 129 Fla. 518, 177
So. 294 (1937).
41
Skinner v. Ochiltree, 148 Fla. 705, 5 So.2d 605 (1941); Coaster Amusement
Co.42v. Smith, 141 Fla. 845, 194 So. 836 (1940); 1 U. oF FLA. L. REV. 470 (1948).
American Dist. Elec. Protective Co. v. Seaboard A.L. Ry., 129 Fla. 518, 177
So. 294' (1937). This case went to the jury without submission of evidence by
defendant; award of new trial after verdict for defendant was affirmed on appeal.
43 Fa. Laws 1949, c. 24236, §3: "No owner shall permit livestock to run at
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that livestock are straying on the public roads logically calls for
44
an explanation from him as to his apparent violation of this duty.
Contributory negligence of the plaintiff, which must be proved
by the defendant,45 bars recovery if it is a substantial factor in
causing the injury. 46 Like alleged negligence of the defendant, con47
tributory negligence of the plaintiff is a question for the jury. It
must be borne in mind that the mere presence of livestock on the
highway, even though in violation of the law, does not give the
is dismotorist a license to kill or injure them. Once their presence
48
collision.
a
avoid
to
care
reasonable
use
must
covered, he
With the exception of those areas in which laws of local application prohibit livestock from running at large,4 9 the mere failure of
the owner to fence, stake, or otherwise restrain his livestock will not,
in and of itself, constitute negligence. The first question is whether
in a particular case the owner could reasonably have anticipated
that his livestock would stray onto a state highway. If his range lies
many miles from the nearest highway or is separated from it by
a river, he might within reason permit his cattle to stray without
anticipating that they would roam for miles or swim the river. These
are perhaps extreme illustrations, but it indicates one type of problem
that may well arise. The same test should be applied to those instances
in which, although the owner fences his cattle and makes adequate
inspections of the fence, a break in it nevertheless occurs and his
livestock pass through this onto the highway.
CONCLUSION

The new liability imposed upon livestock owners is designed primarily to reduce collisions between motor vehicles and animals on
on or stray upon the public roads of this state."
large
44
See note 36 supra.
45White v. Hughes, 139 Fla. 54, 190 So. 446 (1939); Shayne v. Saunders, 129
Fla. 355, 176 So. 495 (1937).
46Stanford v. Atlantic Life Ins. Co., 109 F.2d 428 (5th Cir. 1940); Shayne v.
Saunders, 129 Fla. 355, 176 So. 495 (1937); Boudreau v. Louviere, 178 So. 173
(La. App. 1938).
47
Myler v. Bently, 226 Mich. 384, 197 N.W. 521 (1924); Traill v. Ostenan,
14048Neb. 342, 300 N.W. 375 (1941).
Miller v. Dobbs, 180 Okla. 576, 71 P.2d 737 (1939); Missouri K. & T. By.
32 Okla. 376, 122 Pac. 656 (1912).
v. Savage,
49
FLA. STAT. §168.09 (1949); cf. also, e.g., Fla. Laws 1947, cc. 24496, 24532.
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the public roads of Florida. The efficiency of this statute remains
questionable, however. Passed as a compromise measure, with no
public contribution to the heavy expense of fencing, it leaves numerous
loopholes in enforcement.
As regards impounding, the provisions relating to fees are subject
to attack on constitutional grounds. From an administrative standpoint, it is difficult to envisage a Florida highway patrolman, whose
numerous regular duties continue undiminished, in hot pursuit of a
fleeing razor-back hog. The sheriff and other local law enforcement
officers, precisely because they are local, may quite possibly lack
the zeal required for an efficient impounding campaign in a "cattle"
county. Nor can one expect that in such an area a local jury will
readily find criminal negligence on the part of the owners of the
predominant industry. Upon conviction, the penalty imposed by the
county judge may well be insignificant; the statute fixes merely the
maximum.
In civil actions, in at least some instances, the owner of the animal, after its mutilation by collision, will be difficult to trace. In
all instances, the jury problem arises here too, not only as to negligence of the defendant but also as to contributory negligence on the
part of the plaintiff motorist. Finally, the Supreme Court of Florida
may not apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, although without this
or some inference of negligence the statute becomes virtually useless as a practical matter. The situation would have been greatly
clarified if the Legislature had at least created a presumption of
negligence to be inferred from the mere straying of livestock onto
the public roads. 50
It is quite possible that the entire benefit ultimately resulting from
this high-sounding enactment will in reality consist of no more than
relief of the deceased or injured motorist from the liability of paying
for the animal causing the accident.
PAUL B. JoHNsoN

50 An apt illustration of such a presumption, created for railroad collisions, is

analyzed in Legis., 2 U. oF FLA. L. REv. 124 (1949); cf. Seaboard A.L. Ry. v.
Watson, 103 Fla. 447, 137 So. 719, affd, 287 U.S. 86 (1931); LL. ANN. STAT.
c. 8, §1 (Smith-Hurd 1941), Fugett v. Murray, 31 Ill. App. 323, 35 N.E.2d 946
(1941); Mo. Rnv. STAT. ANN. §14463 (1939).
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